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Introduction
The predicted increase in the years ahead in the numbers of older people in the UK
will result, on the one hand, in an increase in the demand for social care support and
on the other, in a reduction in the proportion of the population of working age. It is
critical, therefore, that new ways of supporting working carers are identified, to
enable them to carry on contributing to society in their dual role as members of the
labour force and as providers of support for dependent people.
The 2001 Census noted that 11% of the population of England and Wales provided
some level of informal care to others. Among those, more than three million
combined caring with employment. For many, the burden of caring hinders their
ability to participate in the labour market, and in some cases, causes them to
withdraw from employment altogether.
The proposed scheme of ‘care vouchers for working carers’ under review in this
paper aims to enable employees to continue providing support to a dependent
person while minimising the impact on their own employment opportunities. In
practice, the scheme would operate in a way similar to the current UK childcare
voucher scheme, whereby employers provide workers with a voucher redeemable
against qualifying care, in lieu of a portion of their income. The voucher would be
exempt from both National Insurance contributions and PAYE on the part of the
employee, and National Insurance contributions on the part of the employer.
The report describes the results of an economic evaluation of the care voucher
scheme, based on a model exploring alternative assumptions about take-up rates
and consequences of the care voucher scheme. Findings are therefore presented in
the context of three alternative scenarios, corresponding to alternative hypotheses
about the likely success of the scheme.
Existing evidence
Welfare implications
Numerous studies point towards the serious adverse effects that caring can have on
the physical and mental health of the carer. A care voucher scheme as evaluated
here would help address these negative impacts. Overall, the beneficial effects would
be likely to extend to care users too, and there is significant evidence in the literature
of the contribution to the wellbeing of people with support needs of measures aimed
at empowering them and at alleviating their feelings of dependency. In some cases,
however, carers and users interests can be in conflict, and some people in need of
support may not wish to have the care provided by a trusted friend or relative
replaced by formal care services.
Employment consequences
The difficulties encountered in combining care-giving and employment severely limit
the potential for carers to participate in the labour market. The paucity of care-friendly
practices in the workplace coupled with significant pay differentials between carers
and non-carers forces many into making an ‘all-or-nothing’ decision. Research
suggests that mechanisms that limit the conflict between care-giving and
employment lead to positive effects in terms of staff retention, employee stress and
sick leave.
3Related schemes
Tax credits in the US cover expenses incurred by the tax-payer in caring for children,
older people and disabled dependents living in the household. Aimed at assisting
low-income families, its effectiveness is questionable, however, as those on low
incomes are often unable to afford the initial expenses incurred. Furthermore, limiting
credits to expenses fails to address the associated costs of in-kind services provided
by carers. Tax credits in the UK are available in the form of Child Tax Credit and
Working Tax Credit. However, a voucher scheme would have obvious advantages in
ensuring the procurement of suitable services.
Childcare vouchers, introduced in the UK in 2005, provide a good example of the
way in which care vouchers for working carers would operate. Childcare vouchers
allow Income Tax and NIC exemptions to the value of the voucher (initially £50 per
week in 2005, rising to £55 per week the following year). The vouchers are primarily
offered as a salary sacrifice.
Take-up
GHS data indicate that in 2000, 15.2% of working-age adults in Great Britain
provided care to a sick, disabled or elderly person. Over two thirds of these were
carers of older people.
A study of the uptake and impact of the childcare-related Income Tax and NIC
reforms suggests that the level of take-up of care vouchers would depend most
significantly on the proportion of employers offering the scheme to their employees.
By 2006, relatively shortly after the launch of the scheme, only 1.4 per cent of
organisations were reported to offer Childcare vouchers. Childcare vouchers were
most commonly offered in large and/or public-sector organisations, with 48.9 per cent
of organisations employing 10,000 or more workers offering the scheme, compared
to less than 1% of those with less than one employee.
Participating organisations generally found childcare support services to be cost-
neutral, with administrative costs being minimal and usually covered by NIC
exemptions afforded to the employer.
Methods and data sources
Numbers of carers/relatives entitled to care vouchers
Due to the availability and comprehensiveness of data relating to carers of older
people, analysis was focused on this group. A spreadsheet-based data model was
constructed, incorporating a matrix of cells that quantified a series of groups of
individuals entitled to take-up care vouchers, based on a bespoke analysis of GHS
2000/01 data. Only relatives or carers of older people with a minimum level of
disability (difficulties performing at least one ADL activity) were assumed to be
potentially likely to take-up a care voucher.
Model structure
Based on the findings of a literature review, carers were grouped by combinations of
factors likely to mediate the likely take-up of care vouchers. These factors included
level of dependency of the user, relational propinquity between carer and user, and
factors relating to the employment status of the carer (sector, income level and
employing organisation’s size). The number of eligible individuals in each group was
multiplied by the corresponding propensity to take-up care vouchers to estimate the
overall level of take-up of the scheme.
4The three scenarios
Given the lack of real life evidence on care vouchers for working carers of disabled
adults, the analysis defined three scenarios reflecting alternative assumptions about
the likely take-up of the schemes. A central uptake scenario was based upon the
take-up of similar schemes reported in the literature review. The effect of the different
factors mediating likely take-up rates was then adjusted to define the high-uptake
and low-uptake scenarios. The high uptake scenario was adjusted to reflect a
situation in which a significantly large proportion of organisations offered care
vouchers for older people, taking the view that increased awareness of the tax and NI
exemptions will lessen the supply-side barriers to take-up. The low take-up scenario
modelled a situation in which demand for care vouchers was lower than that
observed in similar schemes.
Financial implications
Where associated costs and benefits could be identified, these were incorporated
into the model at the group level. To the state, PAYE and National Insurance
exemptions constituted a loss that differed by the income of individuals and the value
of the voucher taken up. Where the scheme allowed individuals to enter the labour
force, the savings from increased tax and NI contributions and reduced JSA
payments were estimated. To the employer, administrative costs were estimated
based on literature relating to similar schemes, as were the savings made through
exemptions on NI contributions.
Analysis limitations
The main limitations of analysis were linked to a lack of real-world evidence on which
to base the assumptions on the model. While childcare vouchers provide the most
relevant source of evidence on which to base the assumptions about likely take-up,
the evidence available relates to very early stages of the implementation of the
scheme, when awareness amongst organisations was notably low. The high take-up
scenario is intended to model the effect of raised awareness amongst organisations.
Due to data constraints, the analysis was focused on carers of older people rather
than carers of all adults. Also, a number of the likely benefits of care vouchers, such
as improved productivity and reduced absenteeism, could not be quantified into the
model due to a lack of evidence.
Results
The central case
Overall, take-up in the central scenario was low, estimated at 47,818 people (1.4% of
the eligible population). This was due largely to the low level of supply assumed,
mimicking the observed patterns for childcare vouchers. The implications for the
public purse were modest, at just over £37 million per year. The monetary value of
care vouchers taken-up in this scenario was approximately £83 million, equivalent to
around 5% of current local authority home care gross expenditure in England.
The high take-up scenario
The high take-up scenario showed a dramatic increase in the number of users, who
were estimated to total 156,163 (4.6% of the eligible population). The cost to the
state under this scenario was approximately £120 million, and the value of vouchers
purchased was over £271 million.
5The low take-up scenario
In the low take-up scenario, a reduction in the demand for care vouchers led to take-
up falling to just 28,236 users, below 1% of eligible carers and relatives. This equated
to £49 million worth of vouchers being provided, at an estimated cost of under £22
million to the state.
Implications
Assuming levels of supply similar to those observed for childcare vouchers would
result in a limited overall take-up of care vouchers. Given the potential benefits of
care vouchers for employers, however, it is likely that marketing and promotion
efforts would result in significant greater number of organisations offering care
vouchers than implied in the low and central scenarios.
More importantly, however, the success of the scheme should be considered not in
terms of take-up but whether the scheme generates net social gains or losses. With
successful implementation and appropriate administration, however, the scheme
could yield benefits that would extend beyond those quantified in the model,
including improvements in productivity and staff retention for employers, and reduced
stress and better employment prospects for carers.
Recommendations
Effective promotion amongst employers would be key to the successful
implementation of a voucher scheme. Restricting access to care vouchers or capping
the amount available to high-income individuals would also serve to limit the risk of
deadweight losses and increase the progressivity of such a scheme.
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2.1 Subject
The proposal under evaluation in this paper is of a system of ‘care vouchers’ to help
employees who balance paid employment with care responsibilities. The voucher
scheme would create an additional funding stream to enable the purchase of
additional care and support services for care recipients who are ‘dependent’ on
working relatives.
2.2 Policy context
It is well documented that the UK has an ageing society - research published by the
Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) predicts that in 30 years, more than 25%
of the population will be 65 and over, an increase of around 70% from the current
level (DWP 2005). By 2051, the number of people aged over 85 will have quadrupled
to reach four million, 6% of the total population. In the context of falling birth rates,
the rising proportion of older people in society will increase the strain on public
finances; the tax base is contracting due to fewer people being active in the
workforce; whilst demand for health and social care services is increasing. The rise in
the total number of people with disabilities is exacerbated by the fact that healthy life
expectancy is increasing at a slower rate than total life expectancy (Wanless 2006).
As well as a need for greater investment in health and social care funding, it is also
clear that efforts must be made to assist those who are able to work to participate in
the employment market. A key area of activity must be people who balance
employment whilst caring for a dependent friend or relative.
The 2001 Census revealed that 11% of the population of England and Wales, 5.2
million people, currently care for their family members, friends and neighbours or
others. More than a million people provide care for over 50 hours per week.
Significantly, three million people combine their caring responsibilities with full or
part-time employment (ONS 2001). Research from the DWP has identified caring
responsibilities as a key “push factor” causing people to disengage from the
workforce and as a “pull factor” encouraging people to voluntarily leave the workforce
(DWP 2006). Often people who decide to leave the workforce do so after finding the
pressure of balancing caring responsibilities with full or part time work to be too much
to bear.
2.3 The care voucher scheme
A system similar to the existing scheme of employer supported childcare could
provide the framework for employers to support their employees with the costs of
relevant and appropriate care and support services, tailored to their individual needs.
Through the scheme, employers would be able to provide a benefit in kind to their
employees in the provision of ‘vouchers’ capable of being redeemed only for
qualifying care. This benefit would be exempt from both National Insurance
contributions (primary and secondary) and PAYE. In addition, the administrative
costs incurred by employers in supporting the scheme should be exempt from any
PAYE or NI liabilities.
The employee would receive the support from their employer, potentially delivered
through a voucher type system. In turn, they could then select the most appropriate
level of support required from a range of accredited and pre-approved providers. The
system will need to strike a balance between the requirement for flexibility (to meet
7the diverse needs likely to be in demand) and the desire for control over the type of
services that qualify for inclusion.
It is important to note that benefits received by employees through this scheme would
be used for services that are not currently wholly provided by the government. Extra
funding would be entirely additional to that which is properly funded by government
and not a substitute for it.
Figure 1 summarises the proposed process for the award of the care voucher.
Figure 1: Care voucher entitlement process
2.4 Evaluation
PSSRU at LSE were commissioned to carry out an economic evaluation of the
voucher scheme. This report summarises the main conclusions of such evaluation.
Whereas an attempt is made to explore outcomes and costs for society as a whole,
the results of the evaluation are presented separately for each of the relevant
stakeholders in the analysis: users, carers, employers and the state.
Given the pre-implementation nature of the analysis, the evaluation was based on a
model which built alternative assumptions about the likely take-up and consequences
of care vouchers (further details about the methods used are provided in Section 2).
Overall, the evaluation presents three alternative scenarios (labelled the central, high
and low take-up scenarios) which correspond to three alternative hypotheses about
the likely success of implementation of the scheme. Importantly, the scenarios were
built in such a way as to be internally consistent, by combining their assumptions in a
manner coherent with the nature of the scenario in question.
The remaining chapters of the report are structured as follows. Chapter 3
summarises the available evidence on similar schemes, their observed levels of take-
up, their costs and their impact on the welfare of users and carers benefiting from
support. Based on the review of the evidence, Chapter 3 also describes the main
parameters required for building the evaluation model. Chapter 4 highlights the main
features of the methods and data sources used in the analysis, and Chapter 5
Employee applies to participate within scheme
Employer considers application. Once approved, employer empowers benefit
provider to provide voucher to employee
Employee consults with care recipient and together they choose qualifying
services from approved list
Professional accredited carer/service provider delivers service, accepting
voucher as all or part of payment
Service provider redeems voucher for monetary payment from benefit provider
8presents the results for each of the three scenarios contemplated. Finally, Chapter 6
discusses the main policy implications of the results, focussing on the key factors
likely to mediate the success of a hypothetical implementation of the scheme.
3 Existing evidence
3.1 Implications for the welfare of carers and care recipients
This section addresses the welfare implications of a care voucher scheme for both
the caregiver and the care recipient. Literature suggests that support of the type
offered by care vouchers would allow caregivers to increase their own skills in the
workplace while continuing to assist the care recipient. It may also serve to alleviate
feelings of guilt on the part of the recipient, although there will always be cases
where care provided by a relative or close friend will be preferable in the eyes of the
care user.
Implications for the welfare of the carer
The informal care literature has demonstrated the adverse effects that caring can
have on both the physical and the mental health of informal carers. For instance, in a
study of carers’ experience of the NHS, Henwood (1998) suggests that more than
half of the carers observed received treatment for stress-related illness during their
time as a carer. Reported ill health on the part of the carer is also believed to rise in
line with the amount of care provided. According to 2001 Census data (ONS 2006), 7
per cent of people that provided care for 1-19 hours per week reported ‘not good
health’. Amongst those providing 20-49 hours per week the level rose to 11 per cent,
and 15 per cent of those caring for 50 or more hours per week. 2000 GHS data
showed the proportion of carers reporting that caring had no effect on their health to
fall as the hours of care they provided increased (ONS 2006): 72 per cent of carers
providing less than 20 hours per week felt that their health had not been affected,
compared to 39 per cent of those providing 20-49 hours, and 28 per cent of those
providing 50 or more hours per week.
Given the significant negative impact that caring can have on their health, providing
additional support to allow informal carers to manage their work and care
commitments is likely to have positive effects upon the mental health as well as the
physical health of the caregiver. A report on the benefits of a caregiver support
service (Johnson and Maquire 1989) found that giving carers a break reduced
anxiety, although other reported problems such as a feeling of helplessness were not
necessarily alleviated. Davies, Fernández and Nomer (2000) also provide
quantitative evidence of the reduction in carer stress associated with the provision of
community care services to older dependent people. In fact, evidence suggests that
the benefits of a voucher would reach further than the immediate carer and recipient,
and would be likely to extend to other relatives of the carers (Yeandle et al (2002)).
The effect of the care voucher on the relationship between the carer and the
dependent person is also an important consideration to factor into the evaluation of
the scheme. Indeed, the provision of support to caregivers often leads to an
improvement in the relationship, as shown for instance by Wright (1998) in the
context of carers of frail older people admitted into care homes.
Implications for the welfare of the care recipient
In addition to the benefits a care voucher scheme would afford to care givers, it is
important to recognise the implications for the recipients of care services. Recent
literature, for instance, has stressed the danger of placing too much emphasis on the
9needs of carers (Morris 1997, Lloyd 2000). Indeed, the introduction of a voucher
system would bring with it a risk, in certain cases where the interests of caregivers
and users are in conflict, of the care user’s wishes being neglected. Also, as noted in
Twigg (1998), older people often want to be cared for by their families and not formal
care providers. Clark et al (1998) suggest that the relationship between older people
and their carers is often as important as the assistance provided. Substitution of
formal for informal care services, therefore, should not be judged purely on the level
of care provided.
Despite these concerns, most of the literature focused on the wellbeing of older
people in receipt of care points towards the positive effects of schemes that empower
the care user. Older people can feel their independence to be undermined by
reliance on family and friends (Clark et al 1998), and would value a scheme that
provided alternative sources of help. Twigg (1992) perceives the issues surrounding
respite care to be a clear indication of the conflicts of interest in the caring
relationship. Whereas the idea of going into an institution is generally looked upon
unfavourably by the dependent person, home care is largely seen as a benefit to
both care giver and user. Thus, insofar as a voucher scheme allows greater access
to home care rather than increasing the likelihood of going into an institution, it would
appear to be in the interest of the both parties.
Based on evidence from other countries, Comas-Herrera et al (2004) state that
restricted access to long-term care resources due to means testing hinders the
dignity, independence and choice implications for care users. Indeed, focus group
participants cited in the Audit Commission’s 2004 Report (Audit Commission 2004)
expressed an acute awareness of the poverty trap where income lifted them above
the threshold for means-tested benefits, leaving them in a position that was worse off
financially. A non-means tested care voucher scheme would reduce the imbalance
between the levels of support provided to those eligible for public funding and the
assistance provided to other dependent people.
3.2 Employment consequences
While the rate of full-time employment is lower amongst carers than non-carers
(Evandrou 1995), a significant proportion of working-age carers combine their care-
giving with employment. According to Arksey et al (2005), this balance is particularly
difficult to achieve for those providing more than 20 hours of care per week and for
those living with the care user. The difficulties faced are often added to by a paucity
of care-friendly practices in the workplace. Bernard et al (2002) noted that managers
would see the combination of work and care as a “balancing act”, whereas the carer
tended to think of their situation as more of a “juggling act”.
The effects of providing care outside the workplace can range from reduced levels of
labour participation to complete withdrawal from the labour market (Evandrou 1995).
Part-time workers are particularly likely to reduce their hours of paid employment
once they start caring (Henz 2004). A recent report on the social and business
benefits of supporting working carers (Bennett et al 2006) stated that currently one in
five people gives up work to care.
A study of the determinants of labour market participation of carers (Heitmueller and
Inglis 2004) found evidence of significant opportunity costs in the form of foregone
wages and wage discrimination. Large wage differentials between carers and non-
carers were apparent, the overall pay gap doubling for those providing more than 20
hours of care per week. The authors also highlighted the ‘all-or-nothing’ decision
faced by many carers, who have to choose whether to enter the labour market and
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have to pay for externally-provided care, or provide informal care themselves,
forgoing the benefits associated with a career. While flexible working arrangements
offer a viable solution in some cases, this is often more difficult in highly specialised
jobs where employees’ skills cannot easily be substituted (Yeandle et al 2002).
The effects of juggling caregiving responsibilities with paid work are also significant
for employers. Gilhooly and Redpath (1997) review American evidence about such
effects, which include absenteeism, lateness and unscheduled absences. In contrast,
the offer of flexible working practices to support carers in the workplace has been
associated with improved staff intake and retention, reduced employee stress and
sick leave, and significant increases in productivity and service delivery (Gilhooly and
Redpath 1997; Bennett et al 2006). Bennett et al (2006) also highlight the relatively
low cost of new measures such as emergency leave in comparison to costs incurred
through the recruitment and training of new staff. By reducing the burden of caring
upon employees, the likely impact of a care voucher scheme would be to lessen
some of the negative effects commonly associated with balancing employment and
care provision.
3.3 Related schemes
A number of related schemes provide an indication of the likely impact and take-up of
a care-voucher scheme. In the US, the Federal Dependent Care Tax Credit covers
expenses incurred by the tax-payer in caring for children, older people and disabled
dependents in the household (Pickard 1999). Eligibility criteria require that more than
half of the dependent’s annual support is received from the tax-payer, and that the
dependent spends at least eight hours per day in the tax-payer’s household. Aimed
at assisting moderate to low-income families, the credit runs in parallel to dependent
tax credits available in a number of individual states. The effectiveness of tax credits
is called into question in a number of reports, however. Keigher and Stone (1994)
comment that low-income families are often unable to afford the initial expenses on
which the credits would subsequently be claimed. Doty (1986) argues that basing
credits solely on expenses drastically reduces its impact, as in-kind services (which
form a large part of the caregiver’s contribution) do not directly incur significant
expenses.
Tax credits are currently available in the UK in the form of Child Tax Credit and
Working Tax Credit, introduced in 2003 in place of Working Families’ Tax Credit,
Disabled Persons’ Tax Credit and Children’s Tax Credit. Child Tax Credit is available
to those with responsibilities for a child, while Working Tax Credit supports low-
income workers by topping up their earnings. Extra credit is available to those
responsible for children, paying for childcare, disabled or over 50. Neither benefit
affects Child Benefit Payments, which are paid separately. A mechanism based on
tax credits, however, is less explicit about the targeting of the benefit on support
services than a care voucher scheme. Additionally, their main objective is not to
improve access to the labour for informal carers.
In the UK, the childcare vouchers introduced in 2005 alongside direct payments and
direct provision of childcare services, as part of Income Tax and National Insurance
Contributions (NIC) reforms, provide a good example of the way in which care
vouchers for working carers would operate. The childcare vouchers allow Income
Tax and NIC exemptions on the value of the voucher (initially £50 per week in 2005,
rising to £55 per week the following year). Exemptions on this weekly amount apply
to both employees (Income Tax and NICs) and their employers (NICs). The vouchers
are primarily offered as a salary sacrifice, whereby the employee is provided with
childcare vouchers in lieu of a portion of their salary.
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3.4 Likely take-up of care vouchers
The 2001 Census and 2000/01 General Household Survey (GHS) provide the most
comprehensive picture of levels of caregiving. An in-depth analysis of the 2000/01
GHS data provided by Pickard (2007) showed that 15.8% of adults in Great Britain
provided care for a sick, disabled or elderly person. Amongst adults of working age
(between 16 and the state pension age), the proportion providing care was 15.2%.
Applying this proportion to the working-age population of England, it can be
estimated that in 2005, approximately 4.8 million people of working age in England
provided informal support to dependent people. 10.7% of people of working age were
carers of an older person (equivalent to 3.4 million people in England in 2005).
A number of factors have been shown to affect the probability that carers would use
schemes such as the care voucher system under review. A study by the National
Centre for Social Research (Kazimirski et al 2006), commissioned by HM Revenue
and Customs, analysed the uptake and impact of the childcare-related Income Tax
and NIC reforms. The assessment was based upon an initial telephone screening of
approximately 3,600 organisations, followed by a telephone survey of approximately
one quarter of the organisations screened.
The study reported that 1.4 per cent of organisations in the sample offered Childcare
vouchers, equivalent to approximately 9,600 organisations in the UK (7,093 to
12,134 organisations at the 95 per cent confidence interval). Both the size and sector
of the organisation were found to have a significant effect on the propensity to offer
childcare vouchers (or indeed other forms of child support). Larger organisations
were significantly more likely to offer vouchers, with 48.9 per cent of those employing
10,000 or more workers offering the scheme, compared to less than 1 per cent of
those with less than 10 employees. The prevalence of childcare-scheme provision
was also highest amongst public-sector organisations. The vouchers were primarily
offered as a salary sacrifice; a minority of employers offered them as an additional
salary, however most did not in order to keep the scheme cost-neutral.
The limited number of organisations reported to be offering childcare vouchers is
explained in part by a lack of awareness of the existence of the scheme at the time of
the study. Overall, only 30 per cent of organisations were aware of the new Income
Tax and NIC exemptions, the single most common first source of information being
an HMRC leaflet. Other reasons cited for organisations not offering support were
insufficient levels of demand from employees, too few employees and the opinion
that it did not fall under the responsibilities of the organisation.
In their report, Kazimirski et al (2006) make a cautious estimate of around 175,000
recipients of financial help through employer-supported childcare in the UK. This
figure includes recipients of direct payments and direct provision, in addition to those
receiving childcare vouchers. In almost 50 per cent of cases, voucher users took up
the limit of the exemptions (£216 to £217 per month, at the time). A larger proportion
of higher-rate tax payers received childcare support compared to the proportion of
higher-rate tax payers in the general population, although the significance of this
difference is not known.
Employers generally found childcare vouchers to be cost-neutral (81 per cent).
Administration-related costs were most commonly reported as equating to less than
one WTE day per month. 87 per cent of providers used an external provider to
manage the scheme, to which most paid a proportion of the value of the voucher (six
per cent, on average). In the majority of cases, however, these costs were offset by
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the National Insurance exemptions applicable to the employer. Indeed, 13 per cent of
organisations surveyed reported making a profit, while only 7 per cent reported an
overall loss as a result of the scheme.
Organisations offering childcare support did not perceive their beneficial effects to be
limited to National Insurance savings. The majority (60 per cent of organisations
offering childcare support) believed that there had been a positive effect on relations
with employees. More than half also reported improvements in employees’ work-life
balance, motivation and commitment. Almost one third reported a positive effect on
productivity, and one fifth found there to be a notable impact on absenteeism
(Kazimirski et al 2006).
4 Methods and data sources
4.1 Numbers of carers/relatives entitled to care vouchers
The main aim of the analysis was to estimate the likely take-up of the proposed care
voucher scheme, and to identify its costs and benefits for care users, informal
caregivers, family relatives and Government in England. Whereas the concept of a
care voucher for working carers need not be restricted to a particular user group, the
analysis was centred on carers of older people. Data relating to this group (which
constitutes over two thirds of all carers of working age) were the most readily
available and compatible with the prevalence indicators used as the basis for
modelling take-up. An estimate of the likely up-take amongst carers of all adult
dependents (based upon the model for older people) is given in the discussion of the
findings later in this paper.
The analysis was spreadsheet-based, and developed a matrix of cells quantifying a
series of groups of individuals entitled to take-up a care voucher. As a result, the
model used as its unit of analysis carers and/or relatives likely to take a salary
sacrifice to purchase care for a dependent older person, rather than older people
themselves. In addition, eligibility to the care voucher scheme was restricted only to
relatives or carers of older people with a minimum level of dependency, set at one or
more problems with ADL activities. Eligibility could ultimately be set at a higher or
lower level than this threshold. For instance, flexible working legislation does not
demand the requirement of any particular level of care or level of dependency, only
that the carer is a relative, partner, spouse or cohabitant of the adult receiving care.
For the purposes of the model, however, and in order to be able to quantify the
potential volume of people interested in care vouchers, the analysis assumed that
eligibility was restricted to carers of individuals with difficulties performing ADL tasks
(such as bathing, dressing and feeding). It is also important to stress, however, that
the nature of the support purchased through the care vouchers need not be restricted
to ADL related caring activities.
An estimate of the number of eligible carers in England was based upon a bespoke
analysis of the General Household Survey Carers 2000/01 survey by Pickard (2007),
which identified the proportion of working-age residents in private households in
Great Britain that cared for someone elderly. These numbers were rescaled to fit the
English context. This analysis indicated that the probability of an adult of working age
(16 to state pension age) providing informal care to an older person in 2000/01 was
10.7%. Applying this proportion to the working-age population of England, it was
estimated that approximately 3.4 million people of working age provided informal
care to an older person at the time of the survey. A significant proportion of informal
caregivers, however, provide informal support to older people of very low
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dependency levels. The number of older people that had no ADL needs but received
informal care were calculated based on the estimates provided by Pickard et al
(2007) Excluding these caregivers from the pool of potential care voucher recipients
left a total of approximately 2.9 million eligible carers1.
The model also took into account the fact that individuals who do not receive direct
informal support might nevertheless have working age relatives interested in funding
a care voucher through a salary sacrifice. Further GHS analysis (Pickard et al 2007)
gave an indication of the number of older people who, despite not receiving informal
support, have close relatives who may potentially be eligible for a care vouchers.
This analysis showed the ratio of dependent older people receiving care to those not
receiving care, according to level of need. Applying this ratio to the number of
existing carers that would be eligible to be use care vouchers, it was estimated that
approximately 500,000 people that did not already provide informal care would be
eligible to use the scheme.
Overall, approximately 3.4 million carer/relatives were therefore identified as
potentially eligible for the care voucher scheme (see Appendix 1).
                                                 
1 It was assumed that carers with no ADL needs would only have one informal carer.
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Figure 2: Factors mediating levels of take-up of care vouchers, and their
benefits and costs
Carer status: Existing carers were considered to be the principal beneficiaries of a
care-voucher scheme. While those who did not already provide care would be
eligible for participation, a smaller proportion would be likely to use it.
Employment status: Take-up was predicted to be highest amongst those already in
employment. Nonetheless, a voucher scheme would also incentivise and facilitate
the transition into employment for a proportion of those currently unemployed or
economically inactive.
Size of organisation*: Supply-side factors would have a large effect on the potential
for take-up. Based on the take-up of similar schemes, larger organisations (defined
as those employing 100 or more workers) are significantly more likely to make care
vouchers available to their employees than smaller organisations.
Employment sector*: Based on analysis of childcare-voucher provision (Kazimirski
et al 2006), it was assumed that care vouchers would be offered by a larger
proportion of public-sector organisations than those in the private sector.
Income level*: As the voucher scheme would comprise a tax exemption, the size of
saving would be highest amongst those paying higher marginal rates of tax.
Consequently, those receiving a higher level of income (over £28,400 per annum at
2000/01 levels) were assigned a higher take-up propensity than those with lower-
level incomes.
Relational propinquity to care recipient: The maxim adopted regarding
relationship to the care recipient was that the closer the relationship, the higher the
propensity to support their relative. While only spouses of working age would be
eligible for participation, take-up amongst eligible individuals with a dependent
spouse was likely to be high. Take-up amongst children and children-in-laws of the
care recipient is likely to be marginally lower, while those of a more distant
propinquity would be still less likely to provide support.
Level of dependency of care recipient: Only older people with one or more ADL
needs (difficulty in performing one or more daily activities such as bathing, dressing
and feeding) were considered to be eligible for support via a care voucher scheme.
This group was separated into those with difficulties in performing one task, and
those that had difficulties performing two or more tasks. Propensity for take-up was
assumed to be highest amongst those whose prospective care recipient had the
greatest level of dependency. This factor was also used to estimate the level of care
required, and consequently the likely size of the voucher used.
*In cases where the individual was initially unemployed or economically inactive, the
average effect of these factors was applied.
4.2 Model structure
These carer and non-carer numbers were broken down according to a number of
factors likely to mediate the probability of take-up of care vouchers, following the
conclusions from the literature review in Chapter 3. The list of factors and their
associated assumptions are detailed in Inset 1, and included informal care provision,
employment status (economically inactive, unemployed and employed), size and
sector of organisation if employed, level of income, relational propinquity to the care
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recipient (spouse, child or other), and the level of dependency of the care recipient.
The distribution of carers according to each of these factors was based on the
analysis of GHS data provided by Pickard (2007). The corresponding distribution for
non-carers eligible to take-up care vouchers was estimated from the 2001 Labour
Force Survey analysis already mentioned above.
Assigning a probability effect to each of the factors in Inset 1 made it possible for the
model to derive estimated propensities to use care vouchers for each analysis group
that reflected the circumstances of the voucher user and the care recipient. Each
characteristic was therefore assigned a value ranging from 0 to 1, representing the
ceterus paribus effect of that characteristic on the individual’s propensity for take-up.
The number of potentially eligible individuals in each group was then multiplied by
their corresponding propensity to take-up vouchers in order to estimate the overall
level of take-up. Using the information in the model relating to the level of economic
activity amongst individuals, it was also possible for the analysis to provide an
estimation of a number of the associated costs and benefit to the Government,
employers and employees.
Appendices 1 to 7 show each of the components of the model for the central
scenario, as well as the hypotheses used to derive the levels of uptake in the low and
high scenarios.
4.3 The three scenarios
Three scenarios were considered, depicting a low, central and high level of take-up
amongst the eligible population.
The assumptions behind the central uptake scenario were chosen so as to
approximate the take-up among similar schemes reported in the literature review
undertaken. The likelihood of take-up effects assigned to individual factors were
subsequently adjusted to model the low and high take-up scenarios. In particular, the
assumptions underlying the high take-up scenario were chosen to illustrate a
situation whereby significantly larger proportions of organisations would offer care
voucher schemes for older people, perhaps as a result of their effect on worker
productivity and absenteeism rates. In other words, supply-side factors were adjusted
disproportionately in the high take-up scenario. This strategy reflected the fact that
the low proportion of organisations offering care vouchers in the central model, which
itself reflected findings relating to the availability and use of childcare vouchers
(Kazimirski et al 2006), constituted the greatest single barrier to take-up. Indeed,
given that the analysis of childcare voucher take-up was carried out when the
scheme was still in its infancy, the high take-up scenario adopts the optimistic view
that a greater awareness of tax and NI exemptions will yield an increase in supply
amongst organisations.
In contrast, the low take-up scenario modelled a situation whereby demand for care
vouchers for older people among employees would be even lower than the observed
demand for child care vouchers, even though the number of employers offering them
would not decrease.
Whereas the literature review had indicated that a large proportion of existing carers
had left employment in order to provide care (Bennett et al 2006), the analysis of the
carer data used (Pickard 2007) found the proportions unemployed and economically
inactive to be no higher than amongst the general population (LFS 2001). The model
assumed a limited transition effect into employment in all scenarios, given the added
incentive for employment offered by the voucher scheme. The assumption about the
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propensity to use care vouchers for those currently unemployed or economically
inactive was adapted, if only to a limited extent, in line with the overall uptake level
hypothesised in each scenario.
4.4 Financial implications
The analysis estimated, as far as possible, the financial impact of the voucher
scheme on the state and employers. This analysis was based upon data relating to
the administrative costs of running similar schemes, the costs and benefits of the
Income Tax and NIC exemptions, and the likely level of carer transition into
employment. While it is likely that a voucher scheme would bring about further
monetary implications, only those for which quantifiable effects were available were
incorporated into the model.
To the state, the voucher scheme could bring about a reduction in revenue through
PAYE and National Insurance exemptions (equivalent at the individual level to the
value of the voucher times the sum of the taxation rates and employee and employer
national insurance rates). These losses would differ therefore in the model by income
of individuals, and by the dependency of the dependent older person. In the model,
the value of the care voucher was set to £55 per week for carers/relatives of high
dependency older people (with problems with at least 2 ADL activities excluding
bathing) and to £27.5 for carers/relatives of older people with lower dependency
levels.
Theoretically, the voucher scheme would bring about financial gains for the
government in cases where the support funded by the care voucher allowed
individuals to enter the labour force. Indeed, such a move could result in reductions
in Job Seeker’s Allowance payments, and increases in tax revenue and NI
contributions.
Equally, increases in the volume of care services associated with the vouchers could
result in financial gains through reductions in the demand for other related care
services, and particularly in the demand for health care services (Fernández and
Forder 2007, forthcoming). These potential efficiency gains, however, were not
included in the model due to the difficulties involved in their quantification.
In terms of employers, care vouchers would involve some administration-related
financial costs. The analysis based its estimates of administration costs on the
available estimates for similar schemes for supporting children’s carers (Kazimirski et
al 2006), which suggest an average of one day per month per employer as the level
of direct input required by participating employers. In addition to this, most
organisations reported using an external provider to manage the scheme. In the case
of childcare vouchers, this service was most commonly charged to employers as a
proportion of the value of the voucher. The analysis assumed the average charge
reported by employers offering child care vouchers, equivalent to 6% of the value of
the voucher.
In spite of the administrative costs involved, and assuming that employers would be
exempt from paying National Insurance contributions over the value of the salary
sacrifice, care vouchers would in all likelihood be cost-neutral to most employers, and
a source of profit to some, as noted in Section 1.
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4.5 Limitations of the analysis
The main limitations of the analysis were linked to the lack of data, mostly due to the
fact that the evaluation predated the hypothetical implementation of an adult care
voucher scheme. In light of the lack of real world evidence with which to populate the
assumptions of the model, the analysis constructed the central scenario based on the
patterns observed for similar schemes, and particularly on the evidence for the
childcare voucher system reported in Kazimirski (2006). As noted in Section 1,
however, only 30% of the organisations were aware of childcare vouchers at the time
of the survey, a factor which is likely to have been due to the early stage at which
analysis was conducted. The high take-up scenario aims to model the effect of raised
awareness and greater supply of a voucher system amongst organisations.
A further source of caveats about the analysis related to the intractability of some of
the likely effects of a care voucher scheme for older people. Hence, the impact of
care vouchers on the productivity of workers, for instance through a potential
reduction in absenteeism rates, was very difficult to observe and measure due to the
large number of confounding factors present. The Natcen study of employer-
supported childcare (Kazimirski et al 2006) reported that organisations offering
childcare support did associate benefits with the scheme – with 31% indicating that
productivity had improved and 20% reporting reduced absenteeism. With no
indication as to the intensity of these effects or the significance of correlation,
however, it was not possible to model such benefits. It is therefore likely that the
model underestimated to some extent the benefits to employers associated with care
vouchers. Other likely and yet unquantified benefits would include for instance
reductions in caregiver stress (Davies and Fernández, 2000). Equally, it is likely that
the analysis missed some potential negative impacts, such as those felt by users
who see some of the care they receive from their informal caregivers substituted for
care provided by formal services.
5 Results
As indicated above, the analysis applied three sets of modelling hypotheses,
summarised under the labels of ‘central’, ‘high take-up’ and ‘low take-up’ scenarios.
These scenarios were compatible respectively with the take-up patterns currently
observed for the child care voucher scheme; with a scenario where a large proportion
of employers are keen to offer care vouchers due to significant associated gains in
productivity; and with a situation where eligible individuals are less interested in
taking care vouchers for older people than currently observed for child care
vouchers. The remainder of this section summarises the results for each of the
scenarios postulated, focussing on levels of take-up and volume of services
commissioned, implications for the state, and implications for employers.
5.1 The central case
The main results for the central case scenario are summarized in Table 1. Overall,
the level of uptake in the central scenario was low, with less than 50,000 people
assumed to be using care vouchers (approximately 1.4% of the eligible population).
As hinted at above, the main factor contributing to the low levels of take-up was the
limited proportion of employers in the scenario offering care vouchers to their
employees, in line with current evidence about the supply of child care vouchers.
Not surprisingly given the relatively low level of uptake, the implications for the public
purse of the central scenario are very modest, at just over £37 million per year. Also
18
not surprisingly, the beneficial effects on government expenditure of potential
reductions in social security payments and increases in tax revenue generated by
increases in the labour force were found at £1.7 million to be much smaller than the
losses in tax and NI revenue associated with the salary sacrifice scheme (which
accounted for in excess of £38 million).
Overall, the monetary value of care vouchers taken-up in the central scenario was
approximately £83 million, equivalent to around 5% of current local authority home
care gross expenditure in England. The net effect of the care vouchers on the total
volume of hours of care provided would depend, however, on the extent to which
care vouchers were used to finance already existing packages of care, and therefore
acted as a public subsidy to the cost of existing privately funded care. It is difficult to
judge the extent to which such deadweight losses would occur, other than to say that
they would probably be more likely to occur among higher income groups, who might
find it easier to provide financial assistance to their dependent relatives even in the
absence of a care voucher scheme. The group of high income carers/relatives in the
model, however, constituted a small proportion (less than 10%) of the total number of
eligible individuals to the care voucher scheme (see Appendix 1).
Table 1: Summary of results - central scenario
As indicated in the previous section, due to the savings in their NI contributions, the
care voucher scheme could actually represent a small net gain in revenue for
employers. This gain was estimated in the central case to amount to just below £4
million (approximately 4% of the monetary value of care vouchers). It is likely
however that such a picture would vary significantly between individual employers,
depending on the efficiency of their administrative systems and the transaction costs
implied by administering the scheme.
5.2 The high take-up scenario
The high-take-up scenario assumes a very significant increase in the offer of care
vouchers by employers. It is not surprising therefore that as a result the number of
care-vouchers rise dramatically relative to the central scenario, to over 150,000 users
(approximately 4.6% of all eligible individuals), with a value for the volume of care
vouchers of over £270 million (approximately 16% of current gross local authority
home care expenditure). In a situation such as the high take-up scenario, the
increase in the volume of hours of care generated by the care voucher scheme would
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constitute therefore a significant contribution to the overall levels of community care
support provided.
Following the increase in the volume of care vouchers, the financial cost to the state
also increased in the high take-up scenario, to approximately £120 million per year
(44% of the value of the care vouchers). The positive impact on employers revenue
of the scheme, in turn, is scaled up in line with the increase in the volume of care
vouchers contracted. The gain to employers in this scenario was estimated at £12
million, or 4% of the value of the vouchers.
Table 2: Summary of results – high take-up scenario
5.3 The low take-up scenario
The low take-up scenario assumes a reduction in the demand for care vouchers from
individuals. As indicated in Appendix 6, the effect of most of the demand-related
factors mediating the likelihood of uptake were reduced by 10% relative to the central
scenario. As a result, levels of uptake appear to be very small, with just over 28,000
people involved in the scheme (less than 1% of eligible individuals).
Although difficult to quantify, it is likely that the administration costs per case in a
situation such as that described in the low take-up scenario would increase, because
of the loss in economies of scale in the administration processes, particularly in small
firms.
In the low take-up case, the overall value of the care vouchers fell to less than £50
million, only 3% of gross local authority home care expenditure. The cost to the state
was just under £22 million at 45% of the overall value of the care vouchers, while the
overall amount of saving to firms was estimated at £2.2 million.
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Table 3: Summary of results – low take-up scenario
6 Implications
The analysis above has postulated three scenarios, based on alternative
assumptions about, on the one hand, the likely offer of care vouchers by employers,
and on the other the likely demand for care vouchers from employees.
As the results of the central scenario show, levels of take-up of the scheme based
upon current evidence from child care vouchers would be relatively low. Even
assuming a significant willingness from carers and relatives to take up care vouchers,
problems with the level of offer of the scheme by firms such as those observed in the
context of child care vouchers would act as a binding constraint against the
expansion of care vouchers. The success of care vouchers is like to depend,
therefore, on a significant effort to promote the scheme amongst employers.
Importantly, the existing evidence pointing out the benefits of the child care voucher
schemes for employers suggests, long term, a likely increase in the proportion of
firms offering care voucher schemes. Indeed, the model suggests that savings in
National Insurance contributions would be likely to offset the costs of administering
the scheme for a large proportion of employers. As noted above, however, less than
one third of organisations offering childcare vouchers were aware by 2005 of the
availability of tax and NI exemptions available to them and their employees
(Kazimirski et al 2006). Assuming that this barrier to take-up is overcome, the volume
of care vouchers taken-up could be considerable, as indicated by the high take-up
scenario, and would represent a very significant contribution to the overall level of
support provided to dependent people. This would be particularly important at a time
where local authority social care resources are subject to very significant budgetary
pressures.
Levels of take-up, however, need not be the deciding factor for judging the success
of a care vouchers scheme. A more important question appears to be whether the
scheme generates net social gains or losses. This would depend partly on the extent
to which deadweight losses occur, whereby vouchers are used to subsidise already
existing privately financed formal care rather than to fund additional levels of support.
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At a negative extreme, care vouchers could have the effect to act as subsidies to the
cost of care without generating increases in the volume of support provided to
dependent older people.
At face value, however, contributing approximately 45% of the cost of care vouchers
appears to be good value for money for the state, particularly compared with the level
of charges for home care raised by local authorities. Also, the benefits derived from
care vouchers are likely to extend beyond those quantified in the data model. These
are likely to include significant improvements in levels of carer stress, reductions in
levels of absenteeism, and improvements in labour productivity and staff retention.
The lack of quantitative evidence about the intensity of such effects, however,
prevented the analysis from incorporating them into the modelling of the different
scenarios.
Finally, it is also important to note that care vouchers need not be restricted to carers
of older people (as assumed in the modelling). While 10.7% of working-age adults in
Great Britain care for an older person, a further 4.5% care for adults under the age of
sixty-five (Pickard 2007). Extending carer vouchers to all carers of dependent adults
would therefore lead to a significant further increase in the overall volume of support
purchased through care vouchers.
7 Recommendations
The role of care vouchers
Care vouchers, overall, could offer a significant contribution to supporting the needs
of adults in need of support and their caregivers. Implementing the scheme is likely to
generate increases in the volume of support provided, and improvements in labour
market outcomes including labour force participation, increased staff retention and
productivity and reduced absenteeism.
Promoting supply
The analysis above shows, however, that a successful implementation of care
vouchers will depend crucially on the effective promotion of the scheme amongst
employers. In fact, the benefits that care vouchers can offer to employers
themselves, mentioned in previous sections, should make it possible for a large
number of organisations to take part in the scheme.
Effective targeting of vouchers
The impact of the resources invested in the care vouchers on the welfare of users
and carers might be improved by targeting care vouchers on individuals with a
minimum level of dependency. In the data model used for this report, eligibility was
restricted to those with difficulty performing at least one ADL activity, although the
type of care provided need not be restricted to support with such activities.
Minimising deadweight losses
A successful implementation of care vouchers might also depend on the progressivity
of the scheme. In particular, it would be important to include mechanisms for limiting
the risk of deadweight losses by restricting the access or capping the value of the
care voucher for high-income individuals.
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